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Abstract: This paper uses Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 23 sub-Saharan African countries 
to  highlight  the  link  between  mothers’  empowerment  and  gender  bias  in  schooling  decisions  in 
monogamous households. Based on the collective model of Chiappori (1988, 1992), the analysis starts 
with the argument that altruistic fathers and mothers have different effects on the education of their 
sons and daughters as a result of differences in their preferences and/or in the children’s human capital 
technologies. Our empirical analysis uses traditional indicators of women’s empowerment (education, 
labor market participation) and more fastidious indicators provided by DHS surveys (access to mass 
media, decisions about the use of earnings, etc.). The results suggest that empowering mothers could 
lead to improving girls’ school attendance. 
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Gender equality and equity in education are part of the Millennium Development Goals and 
constitute one of six objectives of the program “Education for All” signed by 164 governments at the 
World Forum on Education in Dakar in 2000; however, despite major progress, equal participation of 
girls and boys in schooling remains a challenge in sub-Saharan Africa. This region has low enrollment 
rates and strong gender disparities in education. It is clear that the inequality in levels of education 
of girls and boys is closely related to poverty; however, unequal treatment is not linked exclusively 
to poverty (or explained exclusively by poverty). This problem generally reflects broader disparities 
within a society. These can be the result of social standards – represented by gender
2 – that guide 
behavior and determine the roles of women (girl-children) and men (boy-children) in the family, the 
household, and the society.  
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  aspect  of  gender  bias  due  to  gender  relations  in  the 
household. With this intention, the paper examines the influence of mothers’ empowerment on 
gender differences in schooling decisions. 
The  schooling  decision  used  to  be  studied  within  the  framework  of  the  traditional  unitary 
household  model,  which  ignored  the  “gendered”  nature  of  the  decision-making  process  in 
households. This model attributes no importance to the way that income, roles, and leisure are 
distributed among family members. It does not satisfy the basic principle of the neoclassical theory 
of methodological individualism, the notion that all economic models must find their meaning in 
individual behavior. It supposes a common family income where all sources of revenue are added, 
while empirical studies reject the hypothesis of income pooling in household models. This model 
supposes common preferences, while empirical analysis reveals the existence of a preference for 
gender of offspring, affecting the behavior of the household. For example, Thomas (1994, 2004) 
finds that children’s health achievement is linked to educational attainment and non labor income 
of the parent of the same sex as the child.  King and Lillard (1987) find that among the Chinese in 
Malaysia,  mother’s  education  has  a  positive  effect  on  boys’  and  girls’  schooling  but  father’s 
education  affects  only  sons’  attainment.  Recent  works  use  contingent  valuation  to  study  the 
intrahousehold  decision-making  process  and  show  that  husbands’  and  wives’  behavioral 
characteristics might not be pooled. Whittington et al. (2008) found that wives were significantly 
more likely than husbands to allocate vaccines to their daughters rather than to their sons at lower 
prices. In a general way, the studies reveal that women and girls encounter more difficulties than 
men and boys, partly because they have less decision-making power. 
                                                           
2 “Gender” refers to a set of implicit and explicit rules governing relations between men and women,  giving them distinct 
values, roles, attitudes, work, and obligations. 
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The  decision-making  process  within  the  family  has  received  increasing  attention  recently. 
Developed since 1980, new collective models of household preserve intra-family differences and 
show how gender relations affect decisions regarding allocation of resources, distribution of roles, 
and labor supply in the family. Among these models, one considers household decisions to be the 
result of household members’ engaging in cooperative Nash bargaining (Manser & Brown, 1980; 
McElroy, 1990; McElroy & Horney, 1981) and another as Pareto-efficient outcomes reached through 
collective decision-making processes among individuals of divergent preferences (Chiappori, 1988, 
1992). Non cooperative models of the household have also been used but have led to non-Pareto 
optimal results (Udry 1996; Bergtröm, 1996).  The new collective models assume that household 
allocation outcomes are the result of a bargaining process in which household members – generally 
parents – seek to allocate resources they control to goods they individually prefer. Literature based 
on new models of the household reveals that improvements in women’s status, particularly in terms 
of  their  position  within  the  household,  will  enhance  child  survival  and  improve  the  schooling 
chances of children, especially girls.  For instance, Thomas (1990) shows that unearned income 
controlled by mothers has stronger impacts on family health than income under a father’s control. 
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) found that children in Cote d’Ivoire are in a favorable situation when 
the mother controls an important part of the resources. According to Prabhu (2010), husbands and 
wives claimed to differ in their decision making when interviewed separately but not jointly. The 
author found that wives were more likely to change their opinion to align with that of their spouse; 
however, women with more children were more likely not to change their opinion, supporting the 
literature that women seem to improve the health of children. 
Despite methodological contributions, there is very little literature about collective models of 
the  household  and  education  demand  of  children.  In  this  paper,  education  of  children  is 
characterized as a public good within marriage, and we suppose that husband and wife value the 
schooling of boys and girls differently. The paper uses Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 
23 sub-Saharan African countries to highlight the link between mothers’ empowerment and gender 
bias  in  schooling  decisions  in  monogamous  households.  The  aim  is  to  compare  the  impact  on 
schooling  decisions  of  traditional  indicators  of  women’s  empowerment  with  more  fastidious 
indicators provided by DHS surveys. Section 1 provides brief findings related to the issue of gender 
bias in schooling. Section 2 presents a basic model of a bargaining process in schooling of children. 
Sections 3 and 4 present empirical analysis, discussion, and results of estimation. The results suggest 
that empowering mothers leads to improvement in girls’ participation at school. 




1. GENDER BIAS IN SCHOOLING DECISIONS: THEORY AND 
FINDINGS  
 
There  is  a very  large  body of  literature  on  determinants  of  schooling  in  developing 
countries. This section provides a brief survey of theory and findings closely related to the issue 
investigated in this paper. 
Models of education demand are generally based on quantity-quality models developed 
by Becker and Lewis (1973), and Becker and Tomes (1976, 1986) that describe households’ 
simultaneous decisions regarding fertility and investment in the quality of children. Authors 
interested in the determinants of gender bias in education demand show how a household’s 
decision-maker has an interest in maintaining inequality between genders. A first explanation is 
based  on  altruistic  behavior  of  the  household  head,  who  determines  efficient  allocation  of 
resources  among  children.    A  second  explanation  is  based  on  strategic  behavior  of  the 
household head to ensure future remittances when financing children’s education. 
Becker and Lewis (1973) suggest that a household seeks a maximum number of children of the 
best quality; thus if children have different abilities, the household invests in education of the 
most able one. This conclusion implies that girls are disadvantaged if they are seen as less able 
than their brothers. The quantity-quality model implies that a child with only sisters receives a 
higher investment than a child with only brothers.  Morduch (2000) and Garg and Morduch 
(1998) show that there is a net advantage for a child to have only sisters.  
According to Becker and Tomes (1976, 1986), the household head compares the household’s 
well-being effect, which constrains to compensate the less able, with the price effect, which 
encourages strengthening of the abilities of the most able. Becker and Tomes (1986) show that 
the second effect prevails. Consequently, girls are less educated if they are considered less able. 
In the same way, a gender bias emerges if capacities also reveal the ability to succeed in the 
labor market. In the poor household, boys are favored since the rotten kid theorem implies that 
the most able children have an incentive to voluntarily transfer money to the girls.  
If schooling costs are most important for girls, they are less educated and boys are educated at 
an optimal or under-optimal level, depending on household resources. For  example, Mason and 
Khander (1996) show that direct costs of schooling are higher for girls than for boys in Tanzania; 
Lavy (1996) notices that the distance to school has a more  negative impact on girls than on boys 
in Ghana   Alderman and Gertler (1997) note that girls’ education is more sensitive to prices and 
incomes than that of boys; and  Alderman and King (1998) reveal that gender bias in education 
is most important in poor households; finally, Glick and Sahn (2000) found that the higher the 
household wealth, the higher girls’ participation in school and the lower their dropout rate, 
whereas no effect was found on boys’ education.   5 
 
Barham et al.  (1995),  Balestrino (1997),  Behrman et al. (1982), Alderman and  King 
(1998), Alderman and Gelter (1997), and Cremer and Pestiau (2004) note that the problem 
relates  not  only  to  budget  constraints  but  also  to  the  expected  benefits  of  educational 
investment,  especially  expected  remittances.  Girls  are  less  educated  because  they  are  less 
profitable. This is partly because of labor market discrimination (access and wage), and partly 
because of the remittances themselves, which are usually lower from girls than from boys. 
According to Becker (1991) and Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2002), interdependence of the 
labor and marriage markets implies that girls’ opportunities to find a husband who provides for 
their needs reduces parents’ incentive to send them to school. Conversely, boys’ education 
increases men’s opportunities in both labor and marriage markets.  Echevarria and Merlo (1999) 
show  that  a  relatively  small  biological  difference  between  men  and  women  is  enough  to 
understand a relatively large difference in the level of education  between  men (boys) and 
women (girls). All the factors connected with child bearing decrease labor market participation, 
productivity,  and  labor  income  of  a wife. The  authors consider  a  bargaining  process where 
husbands (who want a child) partially compensate their wives for income lost as a consequence 
of child bearing,
3 increasing the returns on investment in women’s education. Hence, parents 
who choose the level of education for their children must anticipate and solve the bargaining 
problem faced by their children in adulthood. Consequently, parents who take these facts into 
account provide more resources for boys’ education than for girls. The authors note that the 
time cost of having a child increases with the number of children. They construct an indicator of 
child  cost  and,  using  data  from  164  countries,  show  that  average  child  cost  is  higher  in 
developing countries than in developed countries. This explains the lower schooling of girls in 
developing economies. 
Less schooling of girls is due mainly to the greater difficulties for women to value their 
human capital (Appleton, 1990). In societies where women are not expected to be economically 
independent, parents may be less motivated to invest in girls’ human capital. 
2. BARGAINING OVER BOYS AND GIRLS: A BASIC MODEL 
 
The new collective models of household behavior were developed in the 1980s to fill the 
gaps  in  the  traditional  unitary  model  concerning  the  income  pooling  hypothesis  or 
“methodological  individualism”
4  (Chiapporri,  1988,  1992).  Despite  the  methodological 
contribution,  there  is  very  little  literature  about  collective  models  of  the  household  and 
education demand of children. For a non exhaustive list, we can cite the works of Emerson and 
                                                           
3 The wife accepts having a baby if and only if the compensation is higher than lost income.  
4 This principle states that all economic models must find their meaning in the behavior of individu al agents. Therefore, it is 
preferable in modeling the behavior of a household to characterize each of the individuals who compose it by his or her own 
preferences. 6 
 
Portela (2001) for Brazil, Park (2007) for Indonesia, Roushdy (2004) for Egypt, and Koissy-Kpein 
(2008) for Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Ghana. Authors confirm rejection of the income pooling 
hypothesis and the bargaining process for schooling decisions.  
   
Our  analysis  starts  with  an  illustration  of  the  argument  that  altruistic  fathers  and 
mothers  may  have  different  impacts  on  their  sons’  and  daughters’  outcomes  because  of 
differences in their preferences and/or differences in the children’s human capital technologies. 
The  collective  model  of  Chiappori  (1988,  1992)  remains  appropriate  because  it  leaves  the 
underlying nature of the allocation process within the household unspecified but assumes that 
resource  allocations  are Pareto efficient.  So, we  have  a  set of  weights  such that  a  general 
household’s utility function can be represented by a linear combination of father’s and mother’s 
utilities, where the weights on each person’s utility reflect his or her bargaining power in the 
household.  The model supposes that each half of the couple is characterized by his or her own 
utility function and that spouses are not altruistic toward their partner but only toward their 
children. The problem of the parents can be written as maximization of a social function of well-
being:  ) , , ( )) ; , ( 1 ( ) , , ( ) ; , (
, , , g b f f m m m g b m m m m m q q C C q q C U E I W q q C U E I W W Max
g b f m
      (2.1) 
Subject to the budget constraint:
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Where Um and Uf  represent the utilities of the mother (m) and the father (f), which are quasi 
concave,  twice  differentiable,  and  increasing  in  each  argument.  Component  Ci  represents 
consumption by member i (i = m, f) of the couple; qb and qf represent the average quality of 
boys  and  girls.  A  child’s  average  quality  is  determined  by  the  quality  production 
function ) , ( j j j j h S Q q  ,  where  Sj  represents  the  schooling  attendance  of  child  j,  and  hj 
represents a vector of other qualities such as ability and health. Component π represents the 
function  of  distribution,  a  weighting  factor  contained  in  [0,1].  It  generally  depends  on  all 
variables that can affect the distribution of power within the household: prices, incomes (Wm 
and Im), assets, sex-ratio, property rights, and education.  Here, we suppose that π depends on a 
set of indicators of mother’s empowerment in the household (Em). This enables locating the exit 
from negotiation between the father and mother. The preferences of the mother are imposed in 
a dictatorial way in the household if π = 1.    
The Lagrangian of the problem is as follows:  
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The first order conditions give:  7 
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  (2.6)  
Relation (2.6) shows how the preferences of the parents interact with their decision-making 
power. The ratio of the marginal utility of the mother to the marginal utility of the father is a 
decreasing function of π. This implies that, for the same level of well-being, a rise in the level of 
consumption of the father will  coincide with a decrease  in the mother’s bargaining  power. 
 
Concerning education demand, the first order conditions give:  
























































(2.4) in (2.7) or (2.8) implies that  



























































) ; , ( )) ; , ( 1 ( ) ; , (     (j = g, b) (2.10)  
Relation (2.10) implies that at the optimum, the marginal cost in terms of consumption (A) is 
equal to the marginal benefit of investment in education (B). Marginal benefit increases with 
parental weighted preferences for schooling. The marginal cost of schooling increases with the 
costs of schooling of girls (or boys) and weighted preference for consumption.    
At  the  optimum,  the  net  marginal  gain  of  educational  investment,  which  is  equal  to  the 
difference between the marginal benefit of educational investment and the marginal cost of 
educational investment, is null.   
The  educational  demand  function  of  child  j  can  be :  )) ; , ( , ( m m m j j E I W X S     for  j  =  g,  b 
with Xj representing a set of characteristics of child j such as age, rank among children, and sex. 
Several cases explain gender bias in schooling, i.e., Sg < Sb: 8 
 
  Where parents have no preference for the gender of offspring and get the same level of 
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to simplify, we have -pSg<-pSb  or  pSg>pSb, so girls are less educated in this case because of the 
higher costs of schooling than those for boys. 
 
  Where parents prefer boys. The parents get more important satisfaction from education of 
boys and devote more resources to the schooling of boys than to that of girls.  
 





























. Indeed, studies conducted 
in demography, sociology, and anthropology have revealed differences in preference for the 
gender of offspring. For instance, authors have noted that parents with boys are less likely 
to want another child, while the reverse is true for parents with girls, who expect to have a 
boy (Andersson et al., 2004; Quintero Gonzalez & Koestner, 2005; Dahl & Moretti, 2008). 
Dahl and Moretti (2008) use data from China, Vietnam, Mexico, Kenya, and the USA. They 
talk about boys’ polarization and note that pregnant women have a higher probability of 
being married before delivery if the child is a boy, lower probability of divorce, and in case 
of divorce, the father has a greater probability of seeking custody of children if they are 
mainly boys. Authors reveal for Kenya that mothers with girls have a higher probability to be 
in polygamous household. For Brazil, USA, and Ghana, Thomas (1990, 1994) shows that the 
mother has a greater influence on girls’ nutritional status, while the father has a greater 
influence on boys' nutritional status. King and Lillard (1987) found the same results for 
Malaysia, and Koissy-Kpein (2008) for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Guinea, and these authors 
conclude that mothers have a preference for girls’ schooling.    
 












































* ) 1 ( *    . This means that bargaining power of 
the mother is lower than the bargaining power of the father. Consequently, girls are 
less  educated  because  of  the  mother’s power in the household decision-making 
process. 9 
 
o  If we slacken the hypothesis of identical costs, the schooling of girls could be more 
expensive for the  mothers. Thomas (1990) suggests that mothers  prefer girls in 
terms of care and food because girls help with domestic tasks. In this context, the 
loss caused by schooling can be heavier for mothers. Parish and Willis (1993) note 
that the mother “sacrifices” some of her daughters to provide a better education to 
the others. 
 
The collective model indicates that the relative position of mothers within the family, 
especially in terms of bargaining power, could explain the differences in educational investment 
between girls and boys. The difficulty is providing a measure of women’s empowerment in a 
household.  Various  authors  have  argued  that  women’s  empowerment  cannot  be  measured 
directly, but only through proxies such as health, educational level, and knowledge (Ackerly, 
1995).  Economists tend to focus on assets (Thomas et al., 1997; Quisumbing, 1994), unearned 
income (Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990), transfer payments and welfare receipts (Lundberg et al., 
1997), or  labor  income
5  (Koissy-Kpein, 2008).    Thomas  et al.  (1997) use assets at marriage 
because in some parts of Indonesia (for example), spouses can take what they brought into the 
marriage with them  in case the  marriage dissolves. Koissy-Kpein (2008) uses  labor  income 
because the report “Engendering Development” (World Bank, 2001) indicates that women have 
weaker  decision-making  power  in  the  household  because  of  their  limited  capacity  to  act 
independently (particularly if they are not actively participating in the job market). Authors have 
generally found that women’s relative advantage in assets or income share leads to benefits for 
sons, but not necessarily for daughters (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995, for Cote d’Ivoire; Thomas et 
al., 1997, for Indonesia; Koissy-Kpein, 2008, for Guinean monogamous household).    
The level of education has also been used as a proxy for bargaining power (Thomas, 1994; 
Gertler  &  Glewwe,  1992;  Tansel,  1997;  Glick  &  Sahn,  2000).  Koissy-Kpein  (2008)  uses  the 
following  proxies  related  to  education:  education  of  the  mother,  education  of  the  mother 
compared with that of the father, education of the mother compared with that of the father 
and/or the other wives in polygamous households. Analysts also note the effect of marriage 
market conditions, summarized by sex ratio
6 (ratio of males to females computed by age and 
others factors like region of residence, employment status, etc.) or laws governing divorce 
(Lundberg, Pollak,  &  Wales, 1997; Chiappori, Fortin,  &  Lacroix, 2002; Koissy-Kpein, 2008). 
However, sex ratio seems debatable, especially in countries where polygamy has a legal st atus 
or is tolerated. Koissy-Kpein (2008) also uses, for Guinean polygamous household, mothers’ rank 
in polygamous unions as proxy for the marriage market. 
                                                           
5 The author uses IV-estimation to correct the problem of endogenous labor income.  
6 Sex ratio is the usual distribution factor in economic analysis, but analysts doubt the relevance of sex ratio as a measure of 
external opportunities for remarriage. 10 
 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND MEASURE OF MOTHERS’ 
EMPOWERMENT  
A. A PROBIT MODEL OF SCHOOL PARTICIPATION
7  
 
In the previous section, the educational demand function of child j is:    
)) ; , ( , ( m m m j j E I W X S    for j = g, b.    
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Let us suppose Sj*, a latent variable observable only if child j goes to school.    
We have:  j i j j u t empowermen X S    2 1

















X  represents  a  set  of  characteristics  with  β  the  associated  parameters;  the  component 
empowerment represents a set of elements representing the bargaining power of the mother of 
child j and uj the error. 
        ) ( Pr 0 Pr 0 * Pr 1 Pr
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Where F is a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of –u, which equals the CDF of u in the usual 
case of density symmetric about 0. 
The variables that can affect school participation are those traditionally used to analyze the 
demand for education: sex (girl = 1), age, household wealth (see the mode of calculation in 
appendix),  residence  (urban  =  1),  the  number of older  (younger)  sisters (brothers),  father’s 
education  and  mother’s  education.
8  We  pay  special  attention  to  mothers’  empowerment 
indicators. 
B. DEFINITION AND MEASURE OF MOTHERS’ EMPOWERMENT OR 
MOTHERS’ AUTONOMY  
 
A range of terms has generally been used to talk about “women’s status”: empowerment, 
autonomy,  bargaining  power,  domestic  economic  power,  authority,  valuation,  position  in 
society, women’s well-being, etc. (Malhotra et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2003, for a discussion).    
                                                           
7 See CAMERON, C. A. & TRIVEDI, P. K. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 470-471. 
8 The education variable is the effective number of years or level of schooling; therefore it does not take repeated classes into 
account. 11 
 
Women’s status is considered in both absolute and relative terms to men’s, and there is a 
debate  that  autonomy  refers  to  independence  while  empowerment  refers  to  the  power 
relationship with others in interdependence (Govinddasamy & Malhotra, 1996). In the economic 
literature,  the  two  elements  are  the  same.  Indeed,  according  the  marriage  market  theory 
(Becker, 1981), individuals marry because they expect that the output for a couple is at least 
equal to single output. The precursors of collective models and bargaining models define a 
number of factors that influence the utility of reservation in a couple (or output single) and 
threaten the stability of the couple. These factors act like indexes of autonomy for a single 
person whereas they can be interpreted as like indexes of empowerment for a couple. The new 
models of household behavior suppose that the threat of independence (or autonomy) explains 
inter household bargaining power in interdependence and thus empowerment. Consequently, 
empowerment  and  autonomy  are  the  same  while  the  greater  a  woman’s  ability  to  act 
independently outside the household, the greater her bargaining power within the household. 
For  instance,  if  a  woman  has  no  better  alternative  than  to  stay  with  her  husband  (low 
autonomy), she will have no interest in disagreeing with him in the decision-making process 
(empowerment).  The World Bank report titled “Engendering Development” (2001) takes up this 
idea. The report reveals that women in the household have less bargaining power because of 
their lower capacity to act independently from the couple. In our analysis, all the terms used to 
define empowerment are the same and refer to women’s control vis-à-vis family, community, 
and society. Moser (1989) defines empowerment as “the capacity of the women to increase 
their own autonomy and their internal force,” which is identified as “the right to make choices in 
the life and to influence the direction of the changes via the capacity to acquire control on the 
material and nonmaterial resources.” We employ this definition as a reference point in this 
paper, because it combines the three essential ideas of choice, control, and power.    
 
Data  limitations  present  an  important  constraint  in  terms  of  both  measurement  and 
comparability  of  women’s  empowerment.  In  recent  years,  data  collection  methods  have 
become  more  sophisticated,  and  they  provide  important  guidance  for  future  efforts  at 
measuring women’s empowerment (Malhotra et al., 2002).    
In  the  economic  literature,  authors  have  generally  focused on  quantitative determinants of 
empowerment  such  as  education,  control  of  resources,  and  marriage  market  conditions. 
Economists  pay  little  attention  to  the  impact  of  qualitative  factors  on  bargaining  power. 
Malhotra  et  al.  (2002)  or  Agarwal  (1997)  discuss  a  complex  range  of  factors,  especially 
qualitative  ones  that  affect  bargaining  power  in  the  household.  The  authors  note  the 
complexity, importance, and multiple effects of social norms on the bargaining process within 
the household. Authors generally build indexes of autonomy starting from answers to questions 
about elements such as  physical abuse, freedom of movement, decision making with regard to  
meals or purchases,  doctor visits, etc. (Smith et al., 2003 ; Durrant & Sathar, 2000; Jejeebhoy, 
1998).  Jejeebhoy (1998) notes that women who are beaten up are most likely to be the most 
powerless;  they  have  little  autonomy,  in  particular  in  terms  of  decision-making,  mobility,  12 
 
control over resources, or  taking care of themselves or their infants. Jejeebhoy (1998), for India, 
and Roushdy (2004), for Egypt, find that domestic violence affects the autonomy of women, but 
also, the care and the nutritional status of children. Durrant and Sathar (2000) consider the 
effect of external environment and community and show, for Pakistan, that control of resources 
and  absence  of  purdah  and  domestic  violence  decrease  the  risk  of  infant  mortality.  Folbre 
(1997) insists that property rights and low security of land rights for women imply that women 
depend on their (male) husbands or their parents for access to land (ownership). Clark (2004), 
Bruce  and  Clark  (2003),  and  Clark  et  al.  (2006)  note  that  young  married  women  may  use 
condoms more rarely because of a lack of bargaining power in their marriage. 
This analysis starts with the traditional determinants proposed by the economic literature: 
  Education of the mother in years.
9 In a second estimation, the component mother’s 
education is replaced by “mother more educated than father.”  
  Women’s  control  over  resources  within  the  household  through  labor  activity 
(especially, outside the household or on their own land). Concerning labor activities, 
it is difficult to talk about autonomy or empowerment when a woman works for her 
husband, a relative of hers, or a relative of her husband. In these cases, on the 
contrary, we face a relationship of dependence. In our analysis, mothers who work 
on the farm of a relative or on the farm of the husband are comparable to women 
who are housewives. Anderson and Eswaran (2009) find the same result.   
We intend to construct indexes of empowerment with qualitative determinants reflected in the 
DHS women’s questionnaire:  
  Women were asked about the decision maker regarding use of contraception: mainly 
the mother, mainly the husband, joint decision, or other. 
  Women  were  asked  about  decisions  about  spending  their  own  money,  household 
purchases (in general), household purchases for daily needs, visits to family members 
and relatives, meals to be cooked, their own health, etc.  
  Women were asked about access to mass media and frequency of listening to the radio 
or watching TV: not at all, less than once a week, at least once a week, almost every day. 
Indicators are divided into three categories: (1) decisions for the mother (health, how to spend 
her own money, contraceptive use, visits to family members and relatives) taking into account 
the mother’s  independence  in  decisions  concerning  herself,  (2)  decisions  for  the  household 
(purchases, daily needs, and food to be cooked each day) taking into account the effect of the 
mother’s weight in decisions concerning the household in interdependency with the husband, 
and (3) decisions about media access. Exposure and access to media represent an opportunity 
                                                           
9 This variable concerns the years of education corresponding to grade and level. It allows us to avoid repeated years or years of 
interruption.  13 
 
to  receive  information  concerning  child  care,  children’s  (girls’)  education,  family  planning, 
women’s rights, etc., to increase knowledge and shape beliefs, and, in the same way, to increase 
women’s ability to negotiate in the household (Clark, 2004).   
We intend to use weights for answers to questions about the decision maker in the household 
and make a sum for each category; thus the mother has 2 points if she decides alone, 1 point if 
she decides with her husband/partner or other person, and 0 points otherwise.
10 We delineate 
this difference between  autonomous and joint  decisions because of Prabhu’s (2010) findings. 
Indeed, he reveals the complexity of intrahousehold decision making by showing that, for Indian 
households of Navi-Mumbai, husbands’ and wives’ demand and willingness to pay for malaria 
vaccines differed significantly when they were interviewed separately but not when interviewed 
jointly. When husbands and wives had an opportunity to change their opinion during the joint 
interview, the author found that wives were more likely to change their opinion to align with 
that of their spouse. The responses of husbands during joint interviews were more consistent 
with their responses in separate interviews.
11     
Concerning access to media (radio and TV), the mother gets 2 points if she watches TV almost 
every day, 1 point for at least once a week, and 0 points otherwise.     
For  an  alternative measure of women ’s  empowerment,  the  component  “labor  activity”  is 
removed when we have a higher probability of correlation with the proxies of empowerment. 
On one hand, labor market participation represents an important part of women’s emancipation 
and can increase their weight in the decision-making process in the household. On the other 
hand, more emancipated women, who have a greater weight in the decision-making process in 
the household, can be those who work outside the household. Here, we can have a bias of 
simultaneity. So, we finally obtain an ambiguous link of causality between labor activity and 
proxies for the decision-making process.  
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program was originally developed by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Since 1984, the program collects, analyzes, 
and disseminates accurate and representative data by means of more than 200 surveys in more 
than 75 countries.  Concerning the quality of the data, the DHS surveys are among the best 
concerning developing countries. They are organized with the support of ICF Macro, based in 
the United States. DHS samples are representative at national and sub national levels.
12 DHS 
                                                           
10 For instance, the maximum for the first category decision for the mother is 8 points. This means that the mother is her own 
decision maker for her own health, the use of her own money, contraceptive use, and visits to family or relatives. 
11 Prabhu (2010) notes that if wives had no source of income or if they were housewives, they were more likely to change their 
opinion when interviewed with husband s. This result probably shows the link between bargaining power and control of 
resources. This means that women with some source of income are more likely  to retain their opinion and may have some 
decision-making power in the household. 
12 http://www.measuredhs.com/ 14 
 
surveys  provide  cross-country  comparable  data  because  their  methodologies  and 
questionnaires are standardized. The surveys offer detailed information on various subjects, 
including  education,  health,  and  participation  in  the  labor  market,  as  well  as  a  women’s 
questionnaire  providing  detailed  information  on  women’s  activities  and  participation  in  the  
decision-making process. 
The paper is based on information about children between the ages of 7 and 18 who live 
with their two parents in monogamous households. The dependent variable is whether or not a 
child is currently attending school. The DHS women’s questionnaire provides information on 
women younger than 49 years; consequently, the analysis concerns children with a mother 
between 18 and 49 years. We have a sample of 23 countries: Angola (2006-07), Benin (2001), 
Burkina Faso (2003), Chad (2004), Cameroon (2004), Comoros (1996), Congo Brazza. (2005),  
Congo  Rep.  (2007),  Côte  d’Ivoire  (1998-99),  Ethiopia  (2005),  Gabon  (2000),  Ghana  (2008), 
Guinea (2005), Kenya (2003), Lesotho (2004), Liberia (2007), Madagascar (2003-04), Malawi 
(2004), Mali (2006), Mozambique (2003), Namibia (2006-07), Niger (2006), and Senegal (2005). 
For Angola, we have no information about current participation in education; for Gabon, Chad, 
and Comoros, it is not possible to match children aged 14-18 with information on their mothers; 
hence, to obtain comparable results, we work with a sample of 19 countries.  
Table 1 shows the sample of 131,293 children between the ages of 7 and 18 (69,906 
boys and 61,387 girls) living with their two parents in monogamous households. The descriptive 
statistics  suggest  that  65.75%  of  children  in  our  sample  currently  attend  school,  and  the 
proportion  of  girls  in  school  (64.40%)  is  lower  than  that  of  boys  (66.93%).  In  4  of  the  19 
countries,  participation  rates  are  lower  than  50%;  for  example,  in  Burkina  Faso,  38.81%  of 
children in the sample currently attend school. In 11 of the 19 countries, 7 out of 10 children in 
the sample currently attend school.
13 Concerning gender differences, participation rates of girls 
are generally lower than those of boys. For example, in Guinea, 54.52% of boys currently attend 
school, while  only  48.97% of girls go to school.  In 5  out of  19 countries, we note that 
participation rates are higher for girls than for boys: Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, and 






                                                           
13 Remember that the sample is not representative of these countries’ reality since here we are using children between the 
ages of 7 and 18 who live with their two parents in a monogamous household.  15 
 
Table 1. School rates for children between 7 and 18 years old in monogamous households 








n  Proportion   n  Proportion  n  Proportion 
  Benin   8583  69.84%  4708  73.53%  3875  65.34%  8.19% 
Burkina   4705  38.81%  2561  39.44%  2144  38.06%  1.38% 
Cameroon   4291  84.83%  2191  86.49%  2100  83.10%  3.39% 
Congo 
Brazza  2912  91.52%  1472  92.46%  1440  90.56%  1.90% 
Congo Rep.  6072  74.34%  3155  78.03%  2917  70.35%  7.69% 
Cote d’Ivoire   1214  51.89%  675  54.81%  539  48.24%  6.58% 
Ethiopia   11208  47.39%  5951  48.88%  5257  45.69%  3.19% 
Ghana   2088  84.58%  1076  85.13%  1012  83.99%  1.14% 
Guinea   3206  54.52%  1656  59.72%  1550  48.97%  10.75% 
Kenya   4591  86.10%  2423  86.63%  2168  85.52%  1.11% 
Lesotho   3532  85.96%  1816  81.28%  1716  90.91%  -9.63% 
Liberia   3251  65.18%  1684  65.08%  1567  65.28%  -0.20% 
Madagascar   5507  80.21%  2854  79.36%  2653  81.12%  -1.75% 
Malawi   7131  84.42%  3643  84.02%  3488  84.83%  -0.81% 
Mali   8199  47.58%  4367  49.78%  3832  45.07%  4.71% 
Mozambique   6324  71.71%  3321  75.13%  3003  67.93%  7.20% 
Namibia   1947  86.59%  975  85.13%  972  88.07%  -2.94% 
Niger   4841  41.73%  2581  45.33%  2260  37.61%  7.72% 
Senegal   4003  56.73%  2076  58.67%  1927  54.64%  4.03% 
Total  131293  65.75%  69906  66.93%  61387  64.40%  2.53% 
 
Concerning mother’s empowerment, the statistics in table 2 suggest a lower level of 
education of mothers. In only 8 out of 19 countries do we note that mothers’ education level is 
higher than 4 years of education: Cameroon, Congo Brazza, Congo Rep., Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, and Namibia.  For example, we have a mean of 7.4 years of mothers’ education for 
Namibia, 5.11 for Cameroon, and 7.15 for Congo Brazza. In all these countries at least 6 out of 
10 children or girls currently attend school. Three countries among the five that record greater 
participation of girls than of boys have mothers with average education level higher than 6 
years, and the two others countries record average education level higher than 3 years. Table 2 
also  provides  an  interesting  conclusion  about  the  link  between  mother’s  education  and 
participation of girls. Indeed, in Lesotho, approximately 91% of girls in the sample currently 
attend school (and 81% of boys currently attend school), and in this country, approximately 68% 
of the mothers in the sample are more educated than their husbands. Additional examples 
come  from  Namibia  and  Madagascar,  where  approximately  35%  and  27%  of  the  mothers, 
respectively, are more educated than the fathers.   16 
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5. RESULTS  
A. TRADITIONAL MEASURES OF WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT: 
EDUCATION AND SHARE OF INCOME DEVOTED TO 
HOUSEHOLD  
 
Results of the traditional measures of mothers’ empowerment are presented in tables  3–5.  
The tables report elasticities in the form ) ( ) (ln X y   , and these elasticities give the percentage change 
in the probability of school participation in response to one unit change in the explanatory variable. 
Concerning mother’s education, the results suggest that children, both boys and girls, have a 
greater probability of attending school when mothers are educated. The results suggest for Burkina 
Faso, for example, that one additional year of a mother’s education increases the probability of child 
participation in school by 7.7%. The effect of mother’s education on school participation is higher for 
girl’s participation compared with that of boys in Cameroon, Congo Rep., Congo Brazza., Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia,  Guinea,  Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mozambique,  Niger,  and  Senegal; 
representing 14 out of the 19 countries in the analysis. We can talk about a mother’s preference for 
girl’s schooling in these countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, one additional year of mother’s education increases 
the probability of girl’s participation in school by 7.6% and that of boy’s participation by 3.2%. Koissy-
Kpein (2007) also found that one additional year of a mother’s education has a greater impact on girl’s 
participation in school in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea but not in Ghana. Glick and Sahn (2000) also reveal 
this higher impact in Guinea. Their findings confirm our results.    
The effect of the mother’s education on a child’s participation is less than that of the father’s education, 
except  in  Cameroon,  Guinea,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  and  Namibia; 
representing 8 out of the 19 countries in the analysis. This can be due to the lower level of mother’s 
education in the other countries of the study. Tables 10–11, in the appendix, include the results of 
estimations with the components “mother is more educated than father.” The results suggest that 
children, especially girls, are in a better situation when the mother is more educated than the father. 
Indeed, boys and girls have a higher probability of going to school when the mother is more educated 
than the father in Benin, Cameroon, Congo Rep. (for girls only), Côte d’Ivoire (for boys only), Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea (for girls only), Kenya, Lesotho (boys only), Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Namibia, and Senegal; this effect is greater on girls’ education compared with that of boys in Cameroon, 
Congo Rep., Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal, representing 9 of 
the 19 countries in the study. A more educated mother increases the probability of girl’s participation in 
school by 21.5% in Guinea. For Guinean monogamous households, Koissy-Kpein (2007) also found the 
component “mother is more educated than father” significant and positive for girl’s participation at 
school. The author also notes that the effect of this component is higher for girls compare to boys in 18 
 
Ghana.  This confirms our results; however the study by Koissy-Kpein (2007) reveals that the component 
is not significant for boys and girls in Côte d’Ivoire.
14 
Concerning a mother’s activity (work on own land or outside the household), the results suggest 
that  children’s  participation  is  an  increasing  component  of  mother’s  activity.  We  note  that  the 
significance of this component for boys’ and girls’ participation varies depending on the use of the 
component “mother’s education” (tables 4–5) or “mother is more educated than father” (tables 10–11). 
This variation can be due to the endogeneity of the mother’s activity since this component can be 
correlated with children’s participation in school. We maintain that girls’ participation increases with 
mothers’ activity in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
and Mozambique (representing 10 of 19 countries). This means that a mother’s autonomy or economic 
independence is an increasing component of girls’ schooling. This effect is greater on girls’ education 
than that of boys in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, and Mozambique. In Mozambique, mothers’ 
economic independence increases the probability of girls’ participation in education by 4.8%, while the 
effect is not significant for boys’ participation. In Ghana, mothers’ economic independence increases the 
probability of girls’ participation in school by 9.8%, and for that of boys, 6.5%.  
For basic results, we note that the probability of school participation increases with age of 
children, boys and girls, in all the countries.  As expected, girls have a lower probability than boys to go 
to school, except in Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, and Malawi. For example, the results suggest that boys 
in Benin and Burkina Faso have a 13.8% greater chance to go to school than girls. The elasticity is higher 
in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, where boys have 22.8% and 22.9%, respectively, greater chance to go to 
school than girls.  On similar grounds, children in urban areas have a higher probability of going to 
school than children in rural areas, except in Congo Brazza, Ghana, Kenya, and Lesotho. In Burkina Faso, 
a child from an urban area has 78.6% greater chance to go to school than a child from a rural area.  
The results also suggest that father’s education is an increasing component of participation in 
school, except for boys’ participation in Ghana and girls’ participation in Lesotho. The effect of father’s 
education is greater on girls’ schooling than on that of boys in 12 of 19 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Congo rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal. 
Concerning sibling rivalry and the hypothesis of the quantity-quality model, the results provide 
interesting insights into gender inequality and preference for gender of offspring. The results suggest 
that children with older sisters have a greater probability of going to school in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, guinea, Malawi (girls only), Mali, Niger, and Senegal (girls only), and this probability 
increases with the number of sisters, whereas children with older brothers have less probability of going 
to school in Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Congo Rep., Ethiopia, Ghana (boys only), and Lesotho (girls only), 
and this probability decreases with the number of brothers. 
                                                           
14  The study is based on Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) of the World Bank.  19 
 
We  also  note  for  Burkina  Faso,  Congo  Rep.,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  and 
Madagascar  that  girls  with  younger  brothers  have  a  lower  probability  of  going  to  school,  and  this 
probability decreases with the number of younger brothers. This result can be due to both the fact that 
girls take care of the younger children and the preference for boys’ education. For girls, it is better to 
have older sisters in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. These 
results concerning sibling rivalry suggest a preference for boys’ education. It is better for children’s 
participation  in  school  to  have  sisters  than  brothers.  The  results  confirm  the  assumptions  of  the 
quantity-quality model: a child with only sisters receives a higher investment than a child with only 
brothers. The results reveal a parental preference for boys’ education, but we cannot say that this 
preference is due to strategic or efficient behavior.  
Children’s participation in school is an increasing component of household wealth. The richer 
the  household,  the  more  likely  the  children  will  attend  school.  For  Namibia,  the  second  and  third 
quintile are negative and significant for children and girls, but not significant for boys. For Cameroon, 
the component is not significant for boys, and for Ghana, the component is significant only for the third 
quintile (children and boys) and non significant for girls’ estimation. These results can be due to the 
calculation  of  household wealth,  but  since  the  results  are  debatable  in only  7  cases out of 57  (19 
countries and 3 estimations by country), we do not question this mode of calculation.    
 
To conclude this part, we note that mothers’ empowerment in terms of education and labor 
market participation is favorable to girls’ (and children’s) schooling since girls (and children) have a 
greater probability of attending school when the mother is educated, is more educated than the father, 
or works outside the household or on her own land.   
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Table 3. Probit estimation for children's participation in school with traditional measures of empowerment 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Mother’s education  0.032+  0.077+  0.019+  0.006+  0.019+  0.047+  0.028+  0.005*  0.068+  0.012+  0.014+  0.030+  0.016+  0.020+  0.050+  0.050+  0.014+  0.065+  0.029+ 
Mother’s activity  0.140+  0.055  0.021**  0.011  -0.009  0.018  0.212+  0.057+  -0.059*  0.047+  0.021*  0.043  -0.004  -0.002  0.080+  -0.011  0.023  -0.033  0.054* 
Age  0.596+  1.465+  0.244+  0.195+  0.604+  1.037+  1.115+  0.064  0.856+  -0.018  0.411+  -6.469+  0.447+  0.262+  0.867+  0.535+  -0.014  1.062+  0.818+ 
Age2  -0.044+  -0.107+  -0.017+  -0.014+  -0.040+  -0.083**  -0.067+  0.000  -0.061+  0.005  -0.030+  0.670+  -0.034+  -0.016+  -0.058+  -0.031+  0.007  -0.079+  -0.059+ 
Age3  0.001+  0.002+  0.000+  0.000**  0.001+  0.002**  0.001+  -0.000  0.001**  -0.000**  0.001+  -0.022+  0.001+  0.000  0.001+  0.000**  -0.000  0.002**  0.001+ 
Older brothers  0.011  -0.069+  -0.003  0.010*  -0.025+  0.019*  -0.059+  -0.005  0.008  0.004  -0.006  -0.042  -0.005  -0.006  -0.001  -0.004  -0.006  0.001  0.002 
Older sisters   0.027+  0.096+  0.020+  0.001  -0.015*  0.007  0.027**  0.002  0.055**  0.002  -0.002  -0.082+  0.009  0.008  0.051+  -0.007  0.013  0.096+  0.026 
Younger brothers  -0.018+  -0.037*  0.004  0.009**  0.002  0.010  -0.035+  -0.011  -0.026  -0.001  -0.006  -0.017  -0.010**  0.000  0.005  -0.003  -0.000  -0.011  0.037+ 
Younger sisters  -0.022+  -0.010  0.014+  0.003  -0.000  -0.000  -0.012  -0.005  0.002  0.002  -0.020+  0.018  -0.014+  0.001  0.025**  -0.008  0.005  -0.023  -0.001 
Female  -0.138+  -0.138+  -0.033+  -0.017**  -0.100+  -0.228+  -0.075+  -0.005  -0.229+  -0.022+  0.082+  -0.005  -0.000  -0.002  -0.146+  -0.096+  0.026*  -0.295+  -0.082+ 
Father’s education  0.036+  0.087+  0.013+  0.006+  0.021+  0.083+  0.057+  0.006+  0.036+  0.013+  0.004**  0.019+  0.014+  0.011+  0.068+  0.039+  0.010+  0.073+  0.064+ 
Urban  0.072+  0.786+  0.017*  -0.008  0.064+  0.381+  0.416+  -0.003  0.577+  -0.013  0.015  0.110*  0.023**  0.049+  0.431+  0.101+  0.033*  0.524+  0.196+ 
2nd quintile  0.087+  0.221+  0.000  0.024**  0.074+  0.016 
 
-0.001  -0.042  0.047+  0.055+  0.250+  0.047+  0.065+  0.124+  0.058+  -0.041**  0.126**  0.084** 
3rd quintile  0.201+  0.474+  0.040+  0.038+  0.122+  0.118  0.294+  0.070**  0.084*  0.047+  0.079+  0.162**  0.123+  0.087+  0.264+  0.108+  -0.045**  0.195+  0.171+ 
4th quintile   0.300+  0.899+  0.019  0.054+  0.210+  0.096  0.511+  -0.036  0.363+  0.017  0.115+  0.314+  0.138+  0.130+  0.622+  0.173+  -0.047  0.607+  0.291+ 
R²  18.00  24.58  26.74  15.97  17.96  19.09  18.14  11.66  23.35  30.14  22.50  32.65  32.82  14.81  18.37  19.56  20.76  20.57  16.30 
N  8583  4705  4291  2912  6072  1283  11208  2088  3206  4591  3532  3251  5507  7131  8199  6324  1947  4841  4003 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, + P < 0.01 
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Table 4. Probit estimation for boys' participation in school with traditional measures of empowerment 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Mother’s education  0.035+  0.085+  0.016+  0.005+  0.012+  0.032**  0.026**  0.006*  0.060+  0.009+  0.024+  0.025**  0.013+  0.019+  0.035+  0.037+  0.015+  0.056+  0.021* 
Mother’s activity  0.144+  0.029  0.030**  0.003  -0.009  0.106  0.189+  0.051*  -0.108+  0.041+  0.027  0.023  -0.000  0.013  0.098+  -0.028  0.049**  -0.004  0.086** 
Age  0.451+  1.771+  0.305+  0.131*  0.524+  1.275+  0.863+  0.020  0.745+  0.024  0.589+  -5.704+  0.456+  0.213**  0.984+  0.517+  -0.082  1.013+  0.731+ 
Age2  -0.032+  -0.136+  -0.022+  -0.009  -0.035+  -0.109+  -0.046+  0.003  -0.051**  0.002  -0.043+  0.592+  -0.034+  -0.011  -0.067+  -0.031+  0.014  -0.072**  -0.050** 
Age3  0.001+  0.003+  0.000+  0.000  0.001+  0.003+  0.001  -0.000  0.001*  -0.000  0.001+  -0.020+  0.001+  0.000  0.001**  0.001*  -0.001  0.001*  0.001 
Older brothers  0.002  -0.094+  -0.003  0.002  -0.027+  0.032**  -0.088+  -0.023*  0.021  0.007  -0.001  -0.047  -0.004  -0.009  -0.011  -0.007  -0.011  0.011  0.004 
Older sisters   0.016  0.104+  0.011  0.003  -0.009  0.030  0.045**  0.017  0.033  -0.002  -0.007  -0.112+  0.009  0.000  0.027  -0.002  0.022  0.053*  0.005 
Younger brothers  -0.016**  0.004  0.004  -0.000  0.015*  0.031+  -0.028**  0.011  -0.013  0.006  -0.018*  -0.015  -0.006  0.003  0.011  0.009  0.005  0.001  0.027 
Younger sisters  -0.015**  -0.044  0.013**  -0.000  0.014*  0.016  0.002  0.007  0.006  0.005  -0.043+  0.030  -0.012*  0.008  0.023  -0.008  -0.003  -0.017  -0.012 
Father’s education  0.030+  0.087+  0.011+  0.006+  0.018+  0.063+  0.058+  0.003  0.029+  0.014+  0.007**  0.024+  0.016+  0.013+  0.064+  0.036+  0.009+  0.070+  0.058+ 
Urban  0.041**  0.724+  0.007  -0.020  0.029  0.272+  0.415+  -0.006  0.488+  0.003  0.036  0.081  0.017  0.060**  0.420+  0.047**  0.014  0.435+  0.200+ 
2nd quintile  0.041**  0.250+  -0.020  0.030**  0.044*  -0.004 
 
0.000  -0.024  0.053+  0.123+  0.264+  0.051+  0.059+  0.129+  0.068+  -0.032  0.158**  0.102** 
3rd quintile  0.157+  0.526+  0.030  0.030*  0.115+  0.289+  0.261+  0.134+  0.073  0.055+  0.146+  0.145  0.133+  0.083+  0.262+  0.084+  -0.028  0.155**  0.190+ 
4th quintile   0.198+  0.803+  0.002  0.050**  0.195+  0.317**  0.438+  0.021  0.325+  0.034  0.143+  0.278**  0.203+  0.108+  0.639+  0.163+  -0.041  0.561+  0.256+ 
R²  16.66  23.17  24.56  15.81  16.56  18.34  17.92  11.34  21.38  25.97  22.75  32.45  33.58  13.76  18.25  17.18  18.26  18.60  15.11 
N  4708  2561  2191  1472  3155  690  5951  1076  1656  2423  1816  1684  2854  3643  4367  3321  975  2581  2076 





Table 5. Probit estimation for girls' participation in school with traditional measures of empowerment 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Mother’s education  0.031+  0.071+  0.022+  0.007+  0.027+  0.076+  0.030**  0.005  0.081+  0.012+  0.005*  0.036+  0.018+  0.021+  0.069+  0.066+  0.011+  0.077+  0.039+ 
Mother’s activity  0.129+  0.077  0.011  0.019  -0.006  -0.092  0.239+  0.067**  0.006  0.052+  0.013  0.064  -0.009  -0.016  0.060  0.011  0.005  -0.066  0.015 
Age  0.821+  1.071**  0.173**  0.262+  0.617+  0.765  1.391+  0.103  0.953**  -0.060  0.276+  -7.382+  0.424+  0.270+  0.679**  0.504+  0.038  1.120**  0.944+ 
Age2  -0.064+  -0.070*  -0.012*  -0.019**  -0.038+  -0.053  -0.088+  -0.002  -0.068*  0.008  -0.019+  0.763+  -0.032+  -0.016**  -0.043*  -0.026*  0.001  -0.087**  -0.071+ 
Age3  0.002+  0.001  0.000  0.000**  0.001*  0.001  0.002+  -0.000  0.001  -0.000**  0.000**  -0.025+  0.001+  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.000  0.002*  0.002** 
Older brothers  0.022**  -0.038  -0.002  0.018**  -0.024**  -0.016  -0.026  0.027*  -0.007  0.001  -0.010*  -0.038  -0.004  -0.002  0.009  0.001  0.000  -0.010  -0.003 
Older sisters   0.044+  0.075*  0.031+  -0.002  -0.021  0.013  0.008  -0.019  0.072*  0.006  0.001  -0.042  0.009  0.019**  0.081+  -0.013  0.004  0.161+  0.051** 
Younger brothers  -0.017  -0.093+  0.003  0.019+  -0.018*  -0.065**  -0.039**  -0.032+  -0.046  -0.008*  0.002  -0.020  -0.014**  -0.002  -0.005  -0.018  -0.005  -0.029  0.052** 
Younger sisters  -0.035+  0.037  0.013**  0.005  -0.019*  -0.012  -0.027*  -0.017  -0.009  -0.001  -0.002  0.004  -0.016+  -0.005  0.025  -0.010  0.010  -0.029  0.016 
Father’s education  0.044+  0.090+  0.013+  0.006+  0.025+  0.111+  0.055+  0.010+  0.046+  0.012+  0.001  0.013*  0.012+  0.009+  0.072+  0.043+  0.010+  0.076+  0.072+ 
Urban  0.122+  0.861+  0.032**  0.005  0.110+  0.500+  0.425+  0.008  0.688+  -0.028**  0.004  0.144*  0.027*  0.037  0.449+  0.176+  0.045**  0.632+  0.196+ 
2nd quintile  0.161+  0.184**  0.020  0.015  0.113+  -0.008 
 
0.003  -0.068  0.038+  0.004  0.230+  0.043+  0.068+  0.116**  0.043  -0.039**  0.074  0.064 
3rd quintile  0.268+  0.419+  0.048+  0.043**  0.134+  -0.133  0.331+  -0.005  0.106  0.036**  0.029*  0.170*  0.109+  0.086+  0.261+  0.137+  -0.048**  0.258+  0.155** 
4th quintile   0.433+  0.998+  0.043  0.056**  0.228+  -0.226  0.601+  -0.120  0.408+  -0.001  0.095+  0.347+  0.072*  0.149+  0.604+  0.180+  -0.042  0.673+  0.331+ 
R²  19.15  27.21  29.96  16.78  19.85  24.34  18.65  14.73  24.80  36.64  20.59  33.21  32.36  16.94  18.54  21.95  24.60  22.65  17.98 
N  3875  2144  2100  1440  2917  593  5257  1012  1550  2168  1716  1567  2653  3488  3832  3003  972  2260  1927 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, + P < 0.01 23 
 
B. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT  
 
Alternative  measures  of  mothers’  empowerment  refer  to  three  groups  of  proxies  and 
distinguish  among  mother’s  decisions  for  herself  (power  1),  mother’s  decisions  for  the 
household (power 2), and mother’s access to mass media (power 3). We separately take into 
account the fact that mothers decide alone or decide with their partner. We also use weights 
when mother decides alone.    
The results suggest that children are in a better situation when the mother decides for herself in 
Benin,  Cameroon,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Namibia,  and  Senegal  (8  out  of  16 
countries in the study). In Ethiopia, one point for mother’s decision for herself increases by 5.6% 
the probability of children’s participation in school. The impact of decisions for herself is more 
significant  than  the  impact  of  decisions  for  the  household.  Indeed,  children  have  a  higher 
probability of going to school when the mother decides for the household in Benin, Cameroon, 
and Mozambique.  Concerning access to mass media, the results also suggest that mothers’ 
access to media is an increasing component of school participation, except in Congo Brazza., 
Congo Rep., Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Namibia.    
Concerning the effect of mothers’ empowerment on girls’ participation in school, we note for 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali (representing 7 out of 16 
countries), that mother’s decision for herself is an increasing component of girls’ schooling, 
while the component “mother’s decision for the household” is significant only in Mozambique. 
That  means  that  the  impact  of  mothers’  autonomy  is  more  significant  for  girls’  schooling.  
Finally, mothers’ access to mass media is an increasing component of girls’ participation in 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Senegal, 
representing 10 out of 16 countries. For the other countries, the component is positive but not 
significant (except in Niger), suggesting that propaganda campaigns for the education of girls on 
television or radio could have an impact through sensitization of mothers. 
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Table 6. Probit estimation for children’s participation in school with alternative measures of empowerment 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Mother’s education 
0.030+  0.067+  0.017+  0.006+  0.019+  0.042+  0.022+  0.003  0.065+  0.011+  0.014+  0.026+  0.014+  0.020+  0.046+  0.049+  0.013+  0.059+  0.027+ 
Power1 




0.056+  0.021+  0.015  0.001  0.003 
 
0.013+  0.001  0.050+  -0.007  0.013+  0.017  0.025+ 
Power2 
0.020+  0.011  0.006* 
 
0.007 
     
0.004  0.005*  0.002 
 
0.002  -0.004  -0.002  0.014+ 
 
-0.014  -0.015 
Power3 
0.034+  0.103+  0.007*  0.006  0.001  0.045*  0.068+  0.017**  0.031*  0.019+  0.001  0.069+  0.022+  -0.002  0.037+  -0.002  -0.005  0.093+  0.036+ 
Age  
0.573+  1.474+  0.240+  0.194+  0.604+  1.057+  1.118+  0.044  0.846+  -0.027  0.412+  -6.478+  0.436+  0.263+  0.879+  0.533+  -0.004  1.082+  0.826+ 
Age2 
-0.043+  -0.107+  -0.017+  -0.014+  -0.040+  -0.085**  -0.067+  0.002  -0.060+  0.006  -0.030+  0.671+  -0.033+  -0.016+  -0.059+  -0.031+  0.006  -0.081+  -0.059+ 
Age3 
0.001+  0.002+  0.000+  0.000**  0.001+  0.002**  0.001+  -0.000  0.001**  -0.000**  0.001+  -0.022+  0.001+  0.000  0.001+  0.000**  -0.000  0.002+  0.001+ 
Older brothers 
0.008  -0.067+  -0.005  0.010*  -0.025+  0.019*  -0.064+  -0.005  0.006  0.004  -0.006  -0.040  -0.005  -0.006  -0.003  -0.004  -0.006  -0.001  -0.000 
Older sisters  
0.026+  0.095+  0.019+  0.000  -0.015*  0.009  0.026*  0.002  0.053**  0.002  -0.002  -0.082+  0.008  0.009  0.046+  -0.008  0.014  0.094+  0.022 
Younger brothers 
-0.017+  -0.036  0.004  0.009*  0.002  0.010  -0.035+  -0.009  -0.026  -0.001  -0.006  -0.016  -0.008*  0.000  0.004  -0.002  -0.001  -0.013  0.036+ 
Younger sisters 
-0.023+  -0.007  0.014+  0.002  0.000  0.000  -0.014  -0.006  0.003  0.001  -0.020+  0.020  -0.012+  0.001  0.025**  -0.008  0.006  -0.021  -0.001 
Female 
-0.138+  -0.139+  -0.033+  -0.018**  -0.100+  -0.231+  -0.072+  -0.006  -0.227+  -0.022+  0.082+  -0.007  -0.001  -0.002  -0.145+  -0.096+  0.028**  -0.298+  -0.086+ 
Father’s education 
0.037+  0.083+  0.012+  0.006+  0.021+  0.082+  0.056+  0.006+  0.035+  0.013+  0.003*  0.019+  0.014+  0.011+  0.066+  0.040+  0.010+  0.070+  0.064+ 
Urban 
0.070+  0.719+  0.013  -0.012  0.065+  0.352+  0.368+  -0.011  0.547+  -0.015  0.015  0.073  0.018*  0.051+  0.405+  0.097+  0.035**  0.470+  0.181+ 
2nd quintile 
0.081+  0.194+  0.000  0.022*  0.074+  0.009 
 
-0.009  -0.052  0.038+  0.054+  0.220+  0.020  0.067+  0.090+  0.060+  -0.045+  0.064  0.067* 
3rd quintile 
0.194+  0.427+  0.036+  0.032**  0.122+  0.098  0.260+  0.053*  0.071  0.023  0.077+  0.127*  0.069+  0.089+  0.209+  0.110+  -0.045*  0.144+  0.131+ 
4th quintile  
0.275+  0.776+  0.008  0.042**  0.210+  0.067  0.395+  -0.045  0.325+  -0.021  0.114+  0.232**  0.070**  0.134+  0.545+  0.173+  -0.047  0.483+  0.237+ 
R²  17.84  24.96  27.07  16.01  18.00  19.30  18.12  12.24  23.42  29.88  22.41  32.81  33.47  14.84  18.86  19.65  21.19  20.94  16.53 
N  8583  4705  4291  2912  6072  1283  11208  2088  3206  4591  3532  3251  5507  7131  8199  6324  1947  4841  4003 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, + P < 0.01 
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Table 7. Probit estimation for boys' participation in school with alternative measures of empowerment 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Mother’s education 
0.032+  0.075+  0.014+  0.005+  0.012+  0.024  0.019*  0.005  0.055+  0.008+  0.023+  0.020*  0.011+  0.020+  0.032+  0.038+  0.015+  0.052+  0.018 
Power1 




0.054+  0.018**  0.007  0.001  0.010 
 
0.018+  0.000  0.047+  -0.010  0.020+  0.024  0.039+ 
Power2 
0.024+  0.004  0.009** 
 
0.015+ 
     
-0.005  0.005  0.001 
 
0.003  -0.005  -0.001  0.007 
 
-0.014  -0.014 
Power3 
0.034+  0.102+  0.013**  0.007  -0.009  0.064**  0.064+  0.007  0.048**  0.020+  -0.004  0.071**  0.027+  -0.002  0.038+  -0.004  -0.005  0.098+  0.026 
Age  
0.421+  1.785+  0.294+  0.132*  0.528+  1.322+  0.848+  0.015  0.761+  0.016  0.593+  -5.715+  0.439+  0.216**  0.981+  0.520+  -0.035  1.026+  0.749+ 
Age2 
-0.029+  -0.137+  -0.021+  -0.009  -0.036+  -0.113+  -0.045+  0.004  -0.053**  0.003  -0.044+  0.593+  -0.032+  -0.012  -0.067+  -0.031+  0.010  -0.073**  -0.052** 
Age3 
0.001**  0.003+  0.000+  0.000  0.001+  0.003+  0.001  -0.000  0.001*  -0.000  0.001+  -0.020+  0.001+  0.000  0.001**  0.001*  -0.000  0.001*  0.001 
Older brothers 
-0.001  -0.092+  -0.006  0.002  -0.028+  0.031**  -0.092+  -0.024*  0.016  0.007  0.000  -0.044  -0.004  -0.009  -0.012  -0.006  -0.011  0.010  -0.001 
Older sisters  
0.015  0.104+  0.009  0.003  -0.008  0.033  0.045**  0.015  0.038  -0.001  -0.007  -0.112+  0.007  0.001  0.025  -0.003  0.024*  0.051*  -0.000 
Younger brothers 
-0.016**  0.003  0.003  -0.001  0.015*  0.031**  -0.030**  0.012  -0.017  0.005  -0.018*  -0.014  -0.004  0.003  0.011  0.011  0.004  0.000  0.026 
Younger sisters 
-0.016**  -0.043  0.013**  -0.001  0.015*  0.016  0.002  0.007  0.005  0.005  -0.044+  0.032  -0.010  0.008  0.023  -0.008  -0.001  -0.017  -0.010 
Father’s education 
0.030+  0.085+  0.010+  0.006+  0.018+  0.064+  0.057+  0.003  0.027+  0.014+  0.006*  0.024+  0.015+  0.013+  0.062+  0.037+  0.009+  0.068+  0.058+ 
Urban 
0.036**  0.675+  0.003  -0.023*  0.035  0.229+  0.374+  -0.009  0.462+  0.003  0.032  0.047  0.012  0.062**  0.396+  0.050**  0.013  0.380+  0.178+ 
2nd quintile 
0.034*  0.213+  -0.019  0.028**  0.049**  -0.012 
 
-0.002  -0.049  0.042+  0.126+  0.235+  0.014  0.062+  0.102+  0.072+  -0.043  0.095  0.091* 
3rd quintile 
0.150+  0.473+  0.023  0.023  0.118+  0.266+  0.229+  0.126+  0.038  0.028  0.147+  0.107  0.066**  0.086+  0.209+  0.088+  -0.030  0.104*  0.166+ 
4th quintile  
0.183+  0.683+  -0.013  0.035  0.217+  0.265*  0.329+  0.022  0.247+  -0.011  0.152+  0.190  0.111**  0.112+  0.562+  0.171+  -0.043  0.426+  0.226+ 
R²  16.26  23.48  24.98  16.01  16.99  18.64  17.96  11.58  21.29  26.07  22.81  32.62  34.65  13.78  18.71  17.20  18.79  19.13  15.38 
N  4708  2561  2191  1472  3155  690  5951  1076  1656  2423  1816  1684  2854  3643  4367  3321  975  2581  2076 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, + P < 0.01 26 
 
Table 8. Probit estimation for girls' participation in school with alternative measures of empowerment 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon 
Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire 
Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar 
Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique 
Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Mother’s education 
0.028+  0.063+  0.021+  0.007+  0.027+  0.075+  0.025**  0.003  0.079+  0.013+  0.005*  0.032+  0.017+  0.021+  0.065+  0.065+  0.011+  0.070+  0.037+ 
Power1 




0.060+  0.026+  0.029*  0.001  -0.003 
 
0.007  0.004  0.052+  -0.004  0.006  0.010  0.008 
Power2 
0.014*  0.021  0.002 
 
-0.004 
     
0.015  0.004  0.002 
 
0.001  -0.003  -0.003  0.021** 
 
-0.015  -0.018 
Power3 
0.032+  0.103+  0.001  0.005  0.017  0.017  0.075+  0.027+  0.006  0.017+  0.005  0.068*  0.016**  -0.000  0.037**  0.004  -0.004  0.085+  0.049+ 
Age  
0.806+  1.035**  0.178**  0.263+  0.619+  0.751  1.418+  0.045  0.929**  -0.075  0.276+  -7.397+  0.417+  0.268+  0.692**  0.494+  0.031  1.155**  0.954+ 
Age2 
-0.063+  -0.066  -0.012* 
-
0.019**  -0.038+  -0.052  -0.090+  0.002  -0.066*  0.010*  -0.019+  0.765+  -0.032+ 
-
0.016**  -0.044*  -0.025*  0.002 
-
0.090**  -0.072+ 
Age3 
0.002+  0.001  0.000  0.000**  0.001*  0.001  0.002+  -0.000  0.001  -0.00**  0.000**  -0.026+  0.001+  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.000  0.002*  0.002** 
Older brothers 
0.020*  -0.038  -0.004  0.018**  -0.025**  -0.017  -0.032*  0.024  -0.006  0.002  -0.010*  -0.038  -0.004  -0.002  0.005  0.000  -0.000  -0.012  -0.004 
Older sisters  
0.042+  0.076*  0.030+  -0.002  -0.021  0.013  0.004  -0.017  0.070*  0.006  0.002  -0.044  0.008  0.018**  0.073+  -0.014  0.004  0.158+  0.049** 
Younger brothers 
-0.015  -0.091+  0.003  0.018+  -0.019*  -0.065**  -0.039**  -0.027**  -0.041  -0.007*  0.001  -0.020  -0.013**  -0.002  -0.006  -0.018  -0.005  -0.032  0.049** 
Younger sisters 
-0.035+  0.043  0.013**  0.005  -0.020*  -0.014  -0.031**  -0.019  -0.007  -0.002  -0.002  0.006  -0.015**  -0.006  0.025  -0.010  0.011  -0.027  0.014 
Father’s education 
0.045+  0.084+  0.013+  0.006+  0.025+  0.108+  0.053+  0.010+  0.046+  0.012+  0.001  0.013*  0.011+  0.009+  0.071+  0.043+  0.009+  0.071+  0.071+ 
Urban 
0.122+  0.762+  0.028**  0.000  0.101+  0.487+  0.367+  -0.004  0.656+  -0.033**  0.005  0.104  0.023*  0.037  0.422+  0.161+  0.048**  0.581+  0.187+ 
2nd quintile 
0.156+  0.171**  0.020  0.014  0.107+  -0.023 
 
-0.013  -0.060  0.033+  -0.001  0.198**  0.024  0.068+  0.076  0.041  -0.040**  0.017  0.042 
3rd quintile 
0.259+  0.384+  0.048+  0.038*  0.127+  -0.145  0.294+  -0.033  0.122  0.017  0.023  0.138  0.071**  0.086+  0.206+  0.132+  -0.047*  0.210**  0.100 
4th quintile  
0.401+  0.883+  0.041  0.047  0.196+  -0.244  0.473+  -0.147*  0.424+  -0.029  0.086+  0.270*  0.026  0.149+  0.523+  0.169+  -0.040  0.563+  0.253+ 
R²  19.23  27.79  30.26  16.67  19.95  24.27  18.57  15.81  25.09  35.62  20.57  33.35  32.65  16.91  19.01  22.13  24.82  22.87  18.27 
N  3875  2144  2100  1440  2917  593  5257  1012  1550  2168  1716  1567  2653  3488  3832  3003  972  2260  1927 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, + P < 0.01 27 
 
CONCLUSION  
This  paper  uses  DHS  monogamous  household  data  to  highlight  the  link  between 
mothers’ empowerment and schooling of girls. The paper begins by illustrating the decision-
making process concerning girls’ and boys’ schooling and considers a case in which father and 
mother bargain concerning sons and daughters according to their preferences. The assumptions 
of this model imply that less schooling of girls may be the result of lower empowerment of 
mothers in the decision-making process. In the analysis, mothers’ empowerment is defined as 
the capacity of women to increase their own autonomy, to make or influence decisions. We 
compare,  with  an  empirical  analysis,  indicators  traditionally  used  in  economic  literature 
(education  and  labor  market  participation)  with  more  fastidious  indicators  provided  by  the 
surveys.  We  build  proxies  by  considering  mothers’  empowerment  in  decisions  concerning 
themselves, their households, and their access to mass media. The results of our estimation 
suggest that mothers’ empowerment in terms of education and labor market participation  is 
favorable for girls’ (and children’s) education since girls (and children) have a greater probability 
of  attending  school  when  the  mother  is  educated,  more  educated  than  the  father,  and/or 
working  outside  the  household  or  on  her  own  land.  Indicators  from  DHS  surveys  provide 
additional information and reveal that children (and girls) are in a better situation when the 
mother makes decisions for herself. The results also suggest that access to mass media is an 
increasing component of children’s education.  
Our analysis is limited by the fact that it does not take into account dynamics of and 
changes in mothers’ empowerment. For instance, the presence of another wife in polygamous 
societies  may  affect  the  bargaining  power  of  the  mother.  Another  example  comes  from 
Jejeebhoy  (1991),  who  notes  a  dynamic  relationship  between  the  status  of  women  and 
reproductive  behavior  in  India  at  two  successive  stages.  However,  our  conclusions  can  be 
justified by the fact that we have analyzed the decisions at a particular moment, taking into 
account empowerment at this time.    
Another limitation of this analysis is that gender differences may be more obvious for older 
children (between 14 and 18 years old), since older children are socialized differently according 
to gender.  28 
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Household economic status  
Concerning household economic status, the DHS surveys did not collect information on either household income or 
consumption expenditures; however, the surveys provide information about household ownership of various assets and goods and 
characteristics of the household dwelling. Various methods have been used with these kinds of data in the literature to provide 
information about household wealth conditions (see Filmer and Pritchett, 1998, for a review). We use information about possession 
of assets and goods and characteristics of household dwellings to create a proxy of household economic status.  We use a weighted 
sum of number of durables owned. The weights are the proportion of households that do not own the good (asset or characteristic 
of household). This method simply reflects the scarcity of the asset. It assumes that the rarer the good, the more difficult it is to 
acquire and/or the more expensive, and it is reserved for privileged households. Finally, this method gives a more important weight 
to luxury goods and a weaker weight to goods owned by the larger masses and to goods of the first need. We construct quintiles 
based on distribution of the wealth index. Table 9 presents the proportion of households having each type of good: source of 
drinking water piped into the dwelling; flush toilet; electricity, radio, TV, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, car, telephone; modern 
main floor material (parquet or polished wood, vinyl, ceramic, cement, carpet) in four countries of the study. 
Table 9. Proportions of households having each type of good or asset in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Senegal 
 
Burkina Faso  Niger  Mali  Senegal 
source of drinking water: piped into dwelling   0.0308  0.0892  0.0688  0.1997 
type of toilet facility: flush toilet   0.0162  0.0287  0.0257  0.2909 
has electricity   0.1231  0.1702  0.1656  0.3980 
has radio  0.6407  0.5509  0.6953  0.8637 
has TV  0.1209  0.1210  0.2183  0.3520 
has refrigerator  0.0459  0.0589  0.0414  0.1659 
has bicycle  0.7704  0.1279  0.4327  0.1631 
has motorcycle  0.2520  0.0807  0.2938  0.0695 
has car/truck  0.0250  0.0388  0.0406  0.0595 
has telephone  0.0328  0.0140  0.0422  0.1425 





Probit estimation with the component “mother is more educated than father” 
Table 10. Probit estimation of boys' participation in school with the component "mother is more educated than father" 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Age  0.491+  1.595+  0.272+  0.287+  0.440+  0.742**  0.786+  0.170*  0.584**  0.050  0.647+  -7.676+  0.644+  0.232+  0.739+  0.399+  -0.009  1.147+  0.694+ 
Father’s education  0.040+  0.102+  0.022+  0.008+  0.022+  0.070+  0.064+  0.012+  0.039+  0.019+  0.019+  0.032+  0.027+  0.023+  0.073+  0.043+  0.019+  0.086+  0.066+ 
Urban  0.053+  0.825+  0.002  -0.026**  0.044**  0.188+  0.437+  0.021  0.515+  -0.010  0.036  0.152*  0.038**  0.052**  0.442+  0.085+  0.028  0.433+  0.197+ 
2nd quintile  0.068+  0.289+  -0.024*  0.037**  0.029  -0.063 
 
0.027  0.017  0.062+  0.148+  0.270+  0.088+  0.063+  0.148+  0.071+  -0.020  0.132**  0.110+ 
3rd quintile  0.188+  0.484+  0.039**  0.074+  0.108+  0.146**  0.251+  0.045**  0.091**  0.088+  0.216+  0.178*  0.221+  0.096+  0.304+  0.099+  -0.019  0.208+  0.239+ 
4th quintile   0.295+  0.945+  0.044  0.076+  0.184+  0.249**  0.453+  -0.020  0.341+  0.084**  0.215+  0.334**  0.350+  0.159+  0.677+  0.223+  0.007  0.680+  0.279+ 
Mother’s education  0.070+  0.071  0.055+  -0.011  0.021  0.212+  0.096+  0.058**  -0.020  0.061+  0.089+  0.000  0.057+  0.035**  0.057*  0.047+  0.083+  0.012  0.084** 
Mother’s activity   0.199+  0.118**  0.055+  0.024*  0.000  0.116*  0.207+  0.065**  -0.069*  0.065+  0.046**  0.073  0.048+  0.036+  0.124+  0.003  0.055**  0.073  0.115+ 
N  6874  3540  3244  2199  4199  1601  7645  3376  2272  3066  2620  2399  3642  4746  5596  4819  1500  3541  3030 
Note:  The other variables are age², age³, older brothers/sisters, younger brothers/sisters 
 
Table 11. Probit estimation of girls' participation in school with the component "mother is more educated than father" 
 
Benin  Burkina 
Came- 
roon  Congo B  Congo R 
Cote d’ 
Ivoire  Ethiopia  Ghana  Guinea  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia 
Mada- 
gascar  Malawi  Mali 
Mozam- 
bique  Namibia  Niger  Senegal 
Age  0.848+  1.008**  0.240+  0.169*  0.746+  0.237  1.361+  0.064  0.913**  0.016  0.326+  -7.790+  0.499+  0.330+  0.881+  0.430+  0.048  0.847**  1.071+ 
Father’s education  0.052+  0.132+  0.031+  0.008+  0.032+  0.101+  0.070+  0.015+  0.062+  0.025+  0.005**  0.025+  0.026+  0.019+  0.093+  0.067+  0.017+  0.094+  0.082+ 
Urban  0.127+  0.881+  0.061+  0.019  0.147+  0.357+  0.462+  -0.008  0.667+  -0.046+  0.017  0.256+  0.056+  0.050**  0.465+  0.187+  0.005  0.698+  0.225+ 
2nd quintile  0.185+  0.195**  0.019  0.025*  0.104+  0.008 
 
0.031  -0.086  0.072+  0.011  0.258+  0.078+  0.059+  0.138+  0.039  -0.018  0.064  0.075 
3rd quintile  0.301+  0.451+  0.058+  0.069+  0.149+  0.017  0.291+  0.032  0.092  0.060+  0.046+  0.150  0.195+  0.089+  0.301+  0.135+  -0.007  0.253+  0.173+ 
4th quintile   0.559+  1.112+  0.079**  0.082+  0.296+  -0.009  0.542+  0.035  0.404+  0.008  0.090+  0.514+  0.205+  0.159+  0.691+  0.231+  0.014  0.808+  0.368+ 
Mother’s education  0.067+  -0.032  0.066+  0.010  0.070+  0.114  0.133+  0.056**  0.214+  0.077+  0.007  -0.171**  0.061+  0.026*  0.154+  0.108+  0.057+  0.037  0.121+ 
Mother’s activity   0.183+  0.169**  0.039+  0.016  0.011  0.043  0.261+  0.098+  0.088  0.111+  0.023*  0.142*  0.039+  0.001  0.116+  0.048**  0.023  0.010  0.054 
N  5271  2907  3011  2040  3812  1366  6621  2971  2030  2728  2483  2207  3253  4390  4873  4247  1470  3012  2764 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, + P < 0.01 
Note:  The other variables are age², age³, older brothers/sisters, younger brothers/sisters  B.P. 48
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